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Preface
Time-Consistent Solution for the Game
of Information Trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–8
E. Eguiazarova
Abstract
n this paper the questions are considered and examined for a special class of
games which are called ”games of information trading”. It was in Driessen et al.
(1992) that this class of games was introduced and a cooperative model of the game
of information trading was proposed.
The present paper is devoted to the problem of time consistency in the game
of information trading. As a solution concept the Shapley Value is considered. We
show that the Shapley Value is time inconsistent in most cases. A regularization is
proposed and the Shapley Value corresponding to the ”regularized” c. f. is proved
to be time consistent.
Game Problems for Systems with Volterra Evolution.
Fractal Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9–44
S.D. Eidelman and A.A. Chikrii
Abstract
In this work we use the basic ideas of the method of resolving function to obtain
sufficient conditions for solvability of the game problems. Minor assumptions are
made about the dynamical process in order to encompass as wide range of conflict-
controlled processes as possible. A number of fundamental methods exist in the
theory of differential games that allow to formulate conditions for solvability of the
problems of approach and avoidance in one or another class of strategies. Various
mathematical techniques are used depending on the kind of exchange of information
between the players about the process state and also on how the player, standing
on which side the game is analyzed, chooses his control. In this paper as a tool
for investigation was chosen the method of resolving functions based on using the
inverse functionals of Minkowski and substantiating the classic rule of parallel pur-
suit. Under different forms of Pontryagins condition this method was successfully
applied in study of the game problems with groups of participants, games with the
terminal functional, with state constraints and/or with imperfect information as
well as in study of the processes with more complicated than ordinary differential
equations dynamics. This paper is apparently one the first attempts to study the
game problems for system with fractional derivatives. Authors are also unaware of
any existing examples of using the generalized matrix functions of Mittag-Leﬄer,
defined in the paper and playing here an important role.
Parlour Games with a Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45–52
A.Y. Garnaev
Abstract
A new class of parlour games where the players are to maximize the payoffs
depending on sum of hands so that this sum of hands not to exceed a threshold
value is considered. One and two person games are investigated. The optimal
strategies are found in closed form.
Intergenerational Cooperative Solution of a Renewable Resource Extrac-
tion Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53–72
S. Jørgensen and D.W. Yeung
Abstract
In this paper, we present an institutional structure for a cooperative intergener-
ation game of resource extraction. The government plays the role of an arbitrator
and acts as a proxy for unborn individuals. Then we formulate an intergenerational
equity rule for renewable resource extraction which maximizes recurrent resource
rent and satisfies Solow’s (1986, p.143) welfare criterion that each generation is as
well off as any other generations. We designate the rule as the Maximum Recurrent
Rent (MRR) Rule.
One of the most thorny issues in the debate on intergenerational equity is the
absence of an implementation scheme that would be incentive compatible for ratio-
nal agents. Here we show that the MRR rule can be implemented with an incentive
scheme which includes a state-dependent reward, an extraction levy and an entry
fee. Given this incentive scheme the maximum amount of recurrent resource rent
can be achieved by rational behaviour of the extractors.
On a Model of Two-card Poker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73–81
V.V. Mazalov and I.S. Makhankov
Abstract
The game has two players, each is dealt two cards: x1, x2 to the first and y1, y2
to the second player. After seeing his cards each player chooses one of the possible
actions: announcing for ”Lo” or for ”Hi” depending on the value of the hands and
independently of each other. Thus, when making the decision none of the players
knows the choice of the opponent. The player who has announced for ”Lo” in the
case when his opponent announced for ”Hi” loses one unit. If both players announce
for ”Hi” the hands are compared. If the lowest hand of one player is higher than
the highest hand of the other player the former wins ”A”, if otherwise his highest
hand is lower that the lowest hand of the opponent the former loses ”A”. In all
other cases the game is a draw. The present paper dwells on two poker models: one
with simultaneous moves (symmetric) and the other with the players making moves
in turn (asymmetric).
About one Pursuit Problem with Many Evaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82–88
N.N. Petrov
Abstract
Sufficient condition and in some cases necessary conditions of the capture of
even though one evader by the condition of the use by evaders the same control
are derived. This paper is related to the investigations described by Satimov and
Mavatov (1983), Petrov (1997).
On Vector-Valued Markov Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89–100
M. Piˇskuricˇ
Abstract
The paper discusses discounted two-person zero-sum vector-valued Markov games.
The model and the definition of equilibria are presented, and solution procedures,
based on dynamic programming methods are explored.
On a Solution of Cooperative Games under Uncertainty . . . . . . 101–115
A.O. Remizov
Abstract
In this paper a concept of guaranteed root-mean-square division in the cooper-
ative games of two persons without side payment under uncertainty is considered.
On the basis of the collective rationality principle a new concept of guaranteed
root-mean-square division is stated, its properties and problems of existence and
construction in some particular cases are investigated.
Optimal Stopping Games where Players Have
Weighted Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116–131
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
A non-zero-sum n-stage game version of a full-information best-choice problem
under ENV maximazation is analysed and solutions are obtained in some special
cases of 2-person and 3-person games. The essential feature contained in this mul-
tistage game is the fact that the players have their own weights by which at each
stage one player’s desired decision is preferred to the opponent’s one by drawing a
lottery.
Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in a Location Game
with Discriminatory Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132–140
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
Consider a market of a homogeneous product by the two firms I and II. Cus-
tomers in the market are distributed over the given segment [0, 1] with the given
pdff(θ), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 , and the firms I and II are located at the points x and
y , 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1, respectively. A competitive location game of H. Hotelling
with simple discriminatory pricing is considered and pure-strategy equilibrium is
derived. A special three-firm market is also discussed.
Solution of the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Finite Memory in
Hierarchical Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141–163
A.A. Semenishchev
Abstract
A hierarchical statement of the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with finite
memory of the players is considered. An algorithm of constructing the optimal
strategies is developed. It is shown that the profits of both the leader and the
follower are greater than ones, obtained in the case of mutual defection of the
players. For memory length one and two steps the optimal strategy of the leader,
depending on the game parameters, has been constructed.
Convergence of Learning Algorithms for Games on Networks 164–177
M.A. Sukhotina and L. A. Petrosyan
Abstract
The present research considers three different learning schemes for games on a
given network. Each scheme is a dynamic procedure. At any stage of the procedure,
a player comparing his payoff with payoffs of his neighbors can adopt behavior of the
neighbor with the highest stage payoff. The learning schemes differ from each other
only in definition of players stage payoffs (the maximal, the maxmin, or the average
payoff determined by a bimatrix game). Given a 2x2 bimatrix game of a special
type, it is shown that three learning procedures converge after a finite number of
stages in a class of stationary strategies. Some results about the convergence are
obtained for 3x3 bimatrix games.
Subtraction Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178–184
S.V. Vinnichenko
Abstract
The following game is considered. Let positive real numbers m,M,m ≤ M
and a nondecreasing function g(x) defined on ]m,∞[ such that: g(m) ≥ m, g(x) ≤
g(m) +m for m ≤ x < m+ g(m) are given. Two players subtract in turn numbers
from a positive real number X. In the beginning, the first player can subtract any
real number x which satisfies restrictions m ≤ x ≤M. On the next move, the second
player can subtract any real number x′ which satisfies restrictions m ≤ x′ ≤ g(x),
etc. The game ends when the difference becomes non-positive and the player which
doing this becomes a winner.
In the present paper we consider similar problem where the game ends at a
negative difference and the second restriction on the function g is not required.
Optimality Conditions for One-Shot Matrix Games . . . . . . . . . . 185–191
Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon
Abstract
We find two optimality conditions for a one-shot undominated matrix game.
The second optimality condition is formulated by Farkas’ theorem. Using our con-
dition, it is formally proved that there is no optimal solution in a one-shot (2 × 2)
undominated matrix game.
Auction Games and Integrative Imputations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192–203
N.A. Zenkevich
Abstract
The basic auction game with divisible good and its applications are presented.
The Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for basic two-person auction model is
constructed. The main application has been shown for cooperative game. New
optimality principle so-called integrative imputation and optimal integrative impu-
tation (OI-imputation), is constructed . These imputations exist for all considered
cooperative games, but the OI-imputation is unique. The important property of the
imputation is that it is supported by Nash equilibrium in the corresponding auction
game.
